Phishing Campaign Targets Defense and Aerospace Firms Linked to Ukraine Conflict

DomainTools Investigations (DTI) identified a large-scale phishing infrastructure heavily focused on defense and aerospace entities with links to the conflict in Ukraine. The infrastructure comprises a small number of mail servers, each supporting a set of domains designed to spoof that of a specific organization. These domains currently host webmail login pages likely intended to harvest credentials from targeted entities.

This activity is not currently attributed to a specific actor, but available evidence indicates this activity is motivated by cyber espionage, with an emphasis on intelligence collection related to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

Detection of Phishing on a Spoofed Ukroboronprom Domain

DTI initially identified a likely phishing page hosted on the domain kroboronprom[.]com a domain spoofing Ukroboronprom, Ukraine’s largest arms manufacturer. The phishing page, located at https[:]//kroboronprom[.]com/sso/login?url=/webmail/?homepage, presents a webmail login prompt. The attackers appear to have built the page using Mailu, an open-source mail server software available on GitHub.

Analysis using DomainTools Iris revealed that the kroboronprom[.]com domain was first seen on December 20, 2024, was hosted on GHOSTnet VPS, and displayed the website title “Mailu-Admin | Mailu.” The Iris Pivot Engine identified nine other domains with the same website title, hosted on GHOSTnet VPS, and first seen after December 20, 2024¹.

These domains were all registered using the registrar Spaceship. A second search² using the Pivot Engine for domains containing a “-” character, registered via Spaceship, hosted on GHOSTnet VPS IP addresses, and first observed after December 20, 2024 revealed three additional domains: 

• space-kitty[.]online 
• stupid-buddy[.]mom 
• hungry-shark[.]sit

Data from urlscan.io (“urlscan”) shows that each of these domains hosts a Mailu webmail login page identical to one seen on kroboronprom[.]com, strongly suggesting they are being used for credential theft.

Iris data showed that, with the exception of scooby-doo[.]xyz, all of these serve as MX domains for mail servers, which support a large set of spoofed domains imitating organizations in the defense, aerospace, and IT sectors. These domains were registered via Spaceship and first observed some time between December 21, 2024 and March 4, 2025. In total, investigation into this activity identified 878 spoofed domains with naming conventions that added or changed a few characters in the targeted entity’s legitimate domain. 

DTI determined how the actor operationalized this infrastructure. However, the most likely scenario involves phishing emails sent to employees of targeted organizations. The actor likely used spoofed domains in the sender field to make the emails appear as if they originated from within the organization. These emails likely contained malicious links or attachments directing recipients to fake webmail login pages designed to steal credentials.

Expanded Domain Analysis: Links to Credential Phishing and Malicious File Distribution

Further analysis of identified infrastructure using urlscan identified four additional domains likely linked to this activity:

• rheinemetall[.]com
• rheinmetall.com[.]de
• ukrtelecom[.]eu
• funky-bober.art

These domains were visually similar to the MX domains identified above and were also hosted on GHOSTnet VPS infrastructure. Another domain, ukrtelcom[.]com, is likely related to this activity based on Whois data overlap with ukrtelecom[.]eu and rheinemetall[.]com. However, at the time of analysis, ukrtelcom[.]com was not hosted on GHOSTnet VPS and did not host a Mailu credential collection page.

In addition to credential phishing, the actor likely used the subdomain cryptshare.rheinemetall[.]com to distribute malicious files. Data from urlscan indicates this subdomain was used to facilitate file distribution between late January and mid-February 2025. Screenshots show the page requesting a password before allowing users to retrieve a file. The subdomain name and password request page refer to Cryptshare, a legitimate secure file retrieval service. DTI cannot confirm how the actor used this subdomain; however, given the available evidence, it was most likely used to deliver malicious files.

Assessment of Cyber Espionage Activity Targeting Defense and Aerospace Sectors

There is insufficient evidence to attribute this activity to a known actor; however, the activity likely has a cyber espionage motivation. DTI makes this assessment with moderate confidence based on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and the heavy focus on the defense and aerospace sectors. 

The focus on spoofing organizations involved in Ukraine’s defense and telecommunications infrastructure further suggests an intent to gather intelligence related to the conflict in Ukraine. Notably, many of the spoofed defense, aerospace, and IT companies have provided support to Ukraine’s military efforts in its conflict with Russia.

IOCs on GitHub

If the community has any additional input, please let us know.

https://github.com/DomainTools/SecuritySnacks/blob/main/2025/PhishingInfrastructure-UAConflict.csv

Iris Search Hashes

¹

U2FsdGVkX1/N26ISOMEKt52j4qVRCFOeOdJm5/SVrHprkuaLnu2BQeUp0P0Kc6qfHvj5jP53SaAxcYJDb48++Vqi4NintEcAPIkll0UFs8Dqv6g+tIbYEPXAR9Yrlkqv5MIad+FOlQ8f26MzOpo/M7Hqo94HE1H63Jj+B+DEHHMQ6nNrWIpiEy4XT6Zo2FHo8wSby4ujxE+xC+G9wp5KlAQxnpiW3NjxO6N0NRwt/Evi88HuqJkaBsiChU45YFRUQ4ssMz6PTRmx0f3r7oWwdg2x+VYe6gewGBmhrSZ+CYh7szWd8XGZ1bkHs3PO/bJoLLkYXugS+pII3U3SHEDxSg==

²

U2FsdGVkX1/Oxch4IdGieQH7IfShNh73KLEDd36UhzMQ42084cwIoGKpsWU0GBGPtg8+Z3ONxs1f6kJufq/vnm2dFC6OYb0EktrRZwhzkyOZDatwnICp9trBVL1Xa1Ep6ZIxAONKhwESx7raSr+qaQv3eTbH263IY49x6aT1i06O2C48+ZIFN06/+K8+2JIB3qRu18qYJvxZ21dsy77VMz3XHgA0210bqp5/8BFbwJB4HcnLKKLNcssqA+CdMgi4IHEoK/dFEBqHjZuPVo11genM2tr89FwcsEMYGfnDc0tZy1O75JMMwVcXc3rugbRLiRehxUSqXrXc9jda0mjM9IDkmgBYIDw28Cp6jRuUf/I=

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